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A Simple Choice:
Review Essay

by Carl P. Fictorie

I

“ n the beginning” is a phrase well known
to those who are reading this essay. However, this
time the quotation finds its source not in Scripture
but in another source. The passage from which
this phrase is drawn reads as follows:
First, there is the beginning.
In the beginning there was nothing. Absolute
void, not merely empty space. There was no
space; nor was there time, for this was before
time. The universe was without form and void.
By chance there was a fluctuation….From
absolute nothing, absolutely without intervention, there came into being rudimentary
existence.1
Dr. Carl Fictorie is Professor of Chemistry at
Dordt College, Sioux Center, Iowa.

This quotation opens the final chapter of Peter
Atkins’ book Creation Revisited. Atkins is a physical
chemist who has also written extensively for popular
audiences. In Creation Revisited, Atkins makes
the argument that the universe came into being
as a result of random events and is not in need
of any sort of Supreme Being to create it. In this
last chapter, Atkins is very clearly taking his form
and style from Genesis 1 but is reinterpreting it in
light of his materialistic worldview. Throughout
this book, Atkins argues that the universe is very
simple, and that everything in the universe can be
understood and explained in terms of a handful
of basic physical principles. Atkins ends his book
with this cold conclusion: “In such a universe there
is still no purpose behind the benevolence of the
forces” and “That still does not imply a purpose; we
can still remain the children of aimless chance.”2
By now it is clear that Atkins is an atheist, one who
sees the universe as nothing more than a collection
of physical objects that came about by the purely
coincidental balance of forces.
Atkins is the type of person that Wiker
and Witt take to task in their recent book, A
Meaningful World, although they do not cite him
directly. Wiker and Witt open with a story about
an alien who visits Earth and who, in an attempt to
understand the despair rampant in human culture
during our time of modern prosperity, concludes,
“ ‘A poison has entered human culture…. It’s
the assumption that science has proven that the
universe is without purpose, without meaning—
proven it so clearly that one need not even
produce an argument.’…The poison, however, is
real. This book is written as an antidote” (13).
Pro Rege—June 2010
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Atkins is an unapologetic modern prophet of this
purposeless universe, and he is significant because
he has written several popular works interpreting
fundamental physical laws, has written several
popular chemistry textbooks, and has served
on national and international committees that
have produced educational materials. Atkins is
the kind of intellectual professor that defines the
establishment within the university.
Wiker and Witt then proceed to develop their
primary thesis—that the universe is “meaningfull.”3 They open, not by describing what they
understand of the concept of meaningful but rather
how they understand the concept of meaningless.
They characterize meaningless in the sense that
the inherent meaning in things is not absent but
has been lost and needs to be rediscovered, in the
same manner that a new language needs to be
learned. As they develop their idea of meaning,
they introduce the notion of genius to suggest
that nature shows undeniable evidence of genius
and, therefore, requires a creator/designer as an
explanation of this genius.
The argument that Wiker and Witt use is
original, starting with the works of Shakespeare
as a model for understanding meaning and
genius. Wiker and Witt give us a set of criteria
to explain what constitutes a work of genius (7578), characteristics that include depth (of meaning,
vocabulary, etc.), clarity (neither obscure nor drab
but able to communicate so that we comprehend,
but not easily), harmony (all things working
together), and elegance (a coherent and pleasing
unity in diversity the opposite of deconstruction).
They show that Shakespeare, given the depth,
clarity, harmony, and elegance of his works, is
a genius. From this idea, they conclude that
genius is only possible when there is a real author
who wrote the poetry and plays, and cannot be
the result of random chance. Hence, if a work,
any work, displays the marks of genius, one can
reasonably conclude that it is the product of
purposeful design.
This would be a good argument except that
Atkins could similarly describe the universe with
these same adjectives, all the while maintaining
his reductionistic, materialistic worldview. It takes
relatively little study to conclude that the universe
illustrates depth, ranging from subatomic particles
all the way to clusters of galaxies. Atkins certainly
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believes in clarity, claiming that everything in
the universe can ultimately be understood by us
humans. The universe is also harmonious, with
the particles and forces working together, and
explicable, in terms of a yet-to-be-discovered
single equation. Finally, Newton’s equations
of motion, the four laws of thermodynamics,
quantum mechanics, and even the periodic table
are elegant, encapsulating grace and form while

Referring to “meaning,”
Wiker and Witt identify
the heart of the matter:
“meaninglessness is
only an assumption, a
dogma that keeps many
from seeing what should
be obvious” (17). It
is, we might add, an
assumption grounded in
the sinful nature of the
heart of man himself.
being simple and effective. That is, even though
the universe is replete with characteristics of genius,
it can be explained in purely material terms. In
fact, in Atkins’ thinking, humans, including
Shakespeare, have evolved, ultimately from the
Big Bang, via a series of chance events that need
no more explanation than the material processes of
entropy and natural selection.4 But in explaining
it that way, the materialist necessarily narrows
the meaning of the very terms used. Atheists still
use the term “meaning,” but they do so only in
reference to the relationships in the data and make
their explanation in terms of mechanistic natural
laws.
Referring to “meaning,” Wiker and Witt
identify the heart of the matter: “meaninglessness

is only an assumption, a dogma that keeps many
from seeing what should be obvious” (17). It is,
we might add, an assumption grounded in the
sinful nature of the heart of man himself. If, as
the authors argue, evil is “parasitic on good” (29,
251), and the assumption of meaninglessness is
grounded in sin, or evil, then meaninglessness
is fundamentally a problem of sin and is not a
secondary concern (251).
However, Wiker and Witt attempt to argue
for meaning on the basis of the state and nature
of creation. In this way, they are among those
who argue for intelligent design. They believe
that by immersing the reader in the intricacies of
nature and by showing that the genius of nature
parallels the genius of Shakespeare, they will
provide an antidote to the problem. But this
approach is also their weak point. By failing to
attack the assumption as an assumption, by failing
to address the condition of the heart that supports
this assumption, they fail to make a convincing
argument and fall short in their task of writing a
book that serves as an antidote.
That failure does not suggest that the book
has no value. What this book does do is remind
the Christian of the proper understanding of
nature’s place. Nature has been created by a genius
designer, God, and because he is infinitely wise
and almighty, it follows that creation will display
the characteristics of a work of ingenious design.
Wiker and Witt give several eloquent
examples of how design concepts can help us
appreciate the interrelationships, potential, beauty,
and multilevel order in physical constructs such as
the periodic table and the ubiquitous chemical,
water. But simply reminding us of nature’s place
and increasing our appreciation of its qualities
will not make this book the antidote they hope
it will be. A person who is open to the notion of
design will find a helpful view of the world and
will be encouraged to a theistic belief. However,
the staunch atheist will not be swayed.
Wiker and Witt also argue for a designer on the
basis of human appreciation of beauty. They write,
“What we deny is the crudely dogmatic reduction
of the desire for beauty to these [materialistic] levels
alone….Thus, ours is the more inclusive argument,
the one that truly describes our entire human
appreciation of beauty; it doesn’t dogmatically
exclude the higher or reduce what is higher to the

lower aspects of our nature” (116-117). As part
of their effort to argue for a designer, Wiker and
Witt argue for an anti-reductionist interpretation
of nature, thereby using the hierarchy of structure
to contradict reductionist materialism. Herein lies
their challenge: beauty, intelligence, genius, etc.,
cannot be fully explained or appreciated exclusively
in terms of physical or material causes. But that
argument will not convince an ardent materialist,
who refuses to look beyond material causes because
he does not believe there is any other explanation
needed.
Atkins appeals to Ockham’s razor to justify his
reductionism:
Science, as I have said, favours simplicity. Science is the arch-descendant of
Ockam. How dare those theologians so
obscure the truth by their gildings, their
hangings, their sentiment, their wishful
thinking, their personal fears, and their
network of intrusion into personal liberty!
They have no right to claim that ‘God’ is
an extreme simplicity, and as cogent and
potent an explanation of our origins as is
necessary. A ‘God’ is the embodiment of
complexity, the ultimate antisimplicity.
In seeking to understand our origin
and our purpose science examines whether
an absolutely minimal approach is sufficient. Only if a minimal approach is explicitly demonstrated to be inadequate may
there be some justification in indulging in
the soft furnishings of additional hypotheses.5
Atkins claims that God is complex, while science
seeks the simple. Atkins sees religion as the
antithesis to science, basing its explanations on “a
purposeful, unknowable, and incomprehensible
irreducible complexity” called God.6 Atkins is
building his argument on the notion that God
has historically been used to explain those things
which science could not. To Atkins, God is the
complex being that is needed to fill in the gaps in
our knowledge. Therefore, God is obscure because
he cannot be understood except by the theologian
(in a very mystical, veiled, and disguised sense).
In addition, Atkins argues that the reductionist
model of science has enabled humans to develop a
significant understanding of nature, and in this he
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is quite correct. It has been precisely when scientists
(and the natural philosophers who preceded them)
were willing to dig into the details of nature, to
attempt to sort out those areas in which existing
theories fell short, that our understanding of
the workings of nature has improved. That is,
when humans took the stance that nature is a
functioning whole, held together by ordered laws
that are comprehensible to humans and are the
contingent creative activity of God, our ability to
discern those patterns really flourished.
In using a reductionist theory, however,
scientists can begin to do two related things. First,
if they do not need to invoke an act of God to
explain how nature works, they can easily question
whether one needs God at all. Second, if humans
are able to come to a thorough understanding of
how nature works apart from a belief in God, they
can develop hubris, a personal god-complex. These
are Atkins’ failings: he has both questioned the
need for God and, in so doing, displayed hubris.
Wiker and Witt’s fifth chapter, “The Periodic
Table,” illustrates how patterns of understanding
in nature can develop when we turn to empirical
methods. Their purpose is to use the history of the
development of the periodic table to show “…how
many ways human beings as knowers contradict
the canons of materialist reductionism” (111).
Starting with the ancient metallurgists, who
worked with readily available gold to make jewelry
rather than tools or weapons, Wiker and Witt
suggest that these first chemists, along with their
perfumer, potter, and dyer counterparts, worked
more for the sake of beauty than practicality. They
counter the evolutionist, who claims that beauty is
a consequence of sexual attraction, with the claim
that this early chemistry operated at other levels
as well, seeking out beauty for the sake of beauty
as truth.
They then turn to the intellectual pursuit of
the notion of elements—to the Greek philosophers
who sought to understand the ultimate nature of
matter primarily through reason. By the beginning
of the first millennium, we have two parallel threads.
The artisans had the practical skills to manipulate
materials into beautiful objects without asking why,
while the philosophers worked at understanding
the ultimate nature of matter without necessarily
working with the actual materials. The artisans
are the empiricists who do not build a theoretical
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science, while the philosophers are the rational
theorists who fail to use empirical data.
Then they introduce the alchemist, who
brought the technical skills together with the
quest for ultimate knowledge, as manifested in
the philosopher’s stone, and thereby developed
a vast array of methods and knowledge about
the chemical world. In the sense that alchemists
merged theoretical and practical knowledge, they
are the first empiricists. They were driven by a goal
which was not necessarily useful or ultimate, the
search to make gold, but which reflects a belief in
the ultimate order within nature, order that can
be known.
It is the search for an underlying order that
led the first modern chemists, including Boyle
and Lavoisier, to be open to and seek out new
elements or, more importantly, to recognize the
fundamental category of element within nature.
Boyle is highlighted because it was he who
emphasized that the study of chemistry is valuable
in its own right, not because of any practical use
or base emotion (124). From this historical study
outlining the impractical purposes for studying
nature, Wiker and Witt infer that a raw reductionist
interpretation—that science is explicable in
terms of basic instincts—is impossible (145).
However, this argument is drawing from what the
evolutionist would claim is recent history in human
development. That is, human development started
with sexual desire, but as humans continued to
evolve, and their brains developed, other related
abilities arose, including a curious appreciation for
beauty and order within nature.
Wiker and Witt also suggest a correlation
between our conviction of underlying order in
nature and the actual discovery of that order. That
correlation is tutorial in fashion, leading from the
macroscopic to the microscopic, through multiple
levels that cannot be explained by accident alone.
They conclude, “One level of accidental order
could be the result of chance; multiple layers
of integrated order, configured in a way that is
strikingly amenable to discovery, implies conspiracy.
If we find out through scientific discovery that
the universe is intricately ordered in a way that
invites discovery, then it’s most reasonable to cease
trying to imagine ourselves as the hapless creatures
of a nihilist cosmos” (145). This connection is
overstated, however. The materialist will argue that

when there is sufficient evidence of unlikely events
occurring, one cannot systematically eliminate
chance as a possibility. From the point of view of
the materialist, then, it is reasonable to conclude
that bulk-scale order is a necessary consequence of
simple and fundamental laws. In addition, being
creatures within the cosmos necessarily implies
that we are connected to it and that if we have any
intelligence, that intelligence would correlate with
the structure of the cosmos because it is made of
the stuff of nature.

What this book does
do is remind the
Christian of the proper
understanding of
nature’s place. Nature
has been created by
a genius designer,
God, and because he
is infinitely wise and
almighty, it follows that
creation will display the
characteristics of a work
of ingenious design.
Moving from this study of how humans
develop patterns of understanding nature to a
discussion of the manner whereby nature itself
illustrates the genius of design, the sixth chapter
of Wiker and Witt outlines the argument found
in The Privileged Planet, by G. Gonzalez and J.
W. Richards. The argument is grounded in the
observation that the universe has a number of
physical properties and fundamental constants,
which all must be carefully tuned and balanced
so that humans can exist. This is known as the
“anthropic principle.” Because of the high degree
of precision needed for these constants, the

argument suggests that the likelihood of a designer
behind it is the most reasonable conclusion.
However, physicists such as Weinberg, whom
Wiker and Witt cite several times, argue that we
still do not need a designer. Rather, we are still
a product of chance, and it just so happens that
we are here. If the universe had not turned out
the way it did, we would not exist to talk about
it. Weinberg interprets this low probability of a
designer in terms of the “multiple universe theory,”
which states that other universes have existed, and
that we are just part of one that allowed us to
come into being.7 Wiker and Witt simply dismiss
this conclusion (169), even though it is the one
Weinberg’s own science suggests.8 In modern
physics the most fundamental theory of matter is
called “string theory.” While it is still a very new
theory, and largely hypothetical at this point, the
work done on this theory so far suggests that there
may be a large, potentially infinite, number of
solutions to the models within this theory.
According to Weinberg, the way to interpret
this infinite number of solutions is to postulate
multiple universes, a different universe for each
solution to the model. However, each of these
universes would remain inaccessible to us, so this
part of the model is not testable. Weinberg justifies
this conclusion with the comment, “The test of a
physical theory is not that everything in it should
be observable and every prediction it makes should
be testable, but rather that enough is observable
and enough predictions are testable to give us
confidence that the theory is right.” 9 Weinberg
himself is admitting, in effect, that science cannot
answer every question, and that some things have
to be inferred beyond the available data.
Wiker and Witt miss an opportunity to
challenge the presupposition of this materialist.
Weinberg, given his materialism, concludes that
the material explanation, multiple universes, is
correct; he also concludes that our existence is now
highly probable because with an infinite number
of universes, at least one will produce us. On the
other hand, given that we cannot observe alternate
universes (even though they may be conceptually
possible), it seems equally reasonable to infer that
only one universe exists, the one we are in, and
that the particular universe we inhabit was chosen,
with the fine-tuning of the constants carefully
selected, to make us possible. In other words, it

Pro Rege—June 2010

15

would seem that a creator hypothesis is no less
reasonable a conclusion than that of Weinberg.
But at this point we are now reaching beyond
the current boundary of science. Weinberg suggests
that we exist in the one universe, out of an infinite
number of universes available that can support our
existence, while Gonzales and Richards submit that
the uniqueness of our universe is best explained as
the work of an intelligent designer. The reason for
choosing between these two metaphysical options
cannot, by the admission of both sides, be directly
proven from the available evidence. Therefore,
one has to make the choice based on other sources
of information.
Weinberg and Atkins would claim that
there is no other admissible information, that we
have sufficient explanation with the materialistic
understanding, so everything else is superficial.
However, we are able to draw other conclusions
based on this line of reasoning. Weinberg and
Atkins both understand that in a purely material
universe, the idea of purpose has no meaning
and that, therefore, our existence is no more
significant than the existence of any animal, plant,
or, for that matter, mineral. Nor is there any basis
for morality beyond mere social contract, if that
even. We lack significance in a universe that is
unimportant. Atkins explains this way:
My scientific world-view is bleak in terms
of its origins, its motivations, and its future.
…If everything in the world can be accommodated in this bony view, then there is no
justification to impose on our understanding the hypothetical extraneous. …I maintain that all the softenings of my absolutely
barren view of the foundations of this wonderful, extraordinary, and delightful world
are sentimental wishful thinking. …I long
for immortality, but I know that my only
hope of achieving it is through science and
medicine, not through sentiment and its
subsets, art and theology.10
In addition, if we are the product of a random series
of material events, then we must also wonder if we
have any freedom to act in a meaningful way. If
everything is governed by laws which are ultimately
random, our actions cannot be intentional and are,
therefore, utterly meaningless.
It is a wonder that such reasoning has not led
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Atkins to a life of despair about his own existence.
However, Atkins takes some solace in his ability
to understand nature. For Atkins, science is
omnicompetent and eventually will come to an
explanation of everything. Science is, for him, the
“summit of knowledge”11 and will give humans
knowledge of everything. In other words, in Atkins
world, we will become the omnicompetent gods of
the universe and then die and cease to exist.

On the other hand,
we can also consider
the implications of a
designer hypothesis. If
that hypothesis is true,
an ultimate reference
point to the universe
exists, and “meaning”
takes on a genuine
significance. We do
need to wonder what
this designer is like and
what our relationship
to him might be. With
a reference point, our
existence is important,
and good and evil
mean something real.
Obviously, Wiker and
Witt take this stance.
Still, both Weinberg12 and Atkins13
acknowledge that the most basic of human-made
theories will not be able to comprehensively
explain the details of life, consciousness, beauty, or

the weather. This is already evident at the level of
the atom. Quantum mechanics is a mathematical
model, based on physical laws, that is used to
describe and explain the nature of the atom.
However, the mathematics are impossible to solve
exactly, except in the most simple of chemical
systems, the hydrogen atom. That is, chemists find
it necessary to invoke uniquely chemical concepts
such as electronegativity and molecular geometry
into the quantum mechanical model in order to
simplify the features of more complex systems,
including all compounds. Thus, in one sense,
chemistry is not reducible to simple physical laws.
What Weinberg and Atkins do argue is that the
models provide a mechanism, even if we cannot
precisely calculate the outcomes. If we extend this
notion to the concept of life, it is likely that we
will again be faced with an approximation. Even if
the entire machinery of the cell is little more than
biochemical molecules and reactions, it is unlikely
that chemical models alone could be constructed
with sufficient detail to explain every detail of
the cell’s function. This does leave the ardent
materialist with a conundrum. In this worldview,
the universe is a closed system, governed by simple
physical laws. However, the human intellect will
never be able to infer the universe from this single
law because the consequences of the law quickly
become far too complex to use directly. Our
minds and the tools available to us are unable to
fully grasp the universe. In fact, if we did grasp
every detail in the universe, we would necessarily
become a god. What Weinberg and Atkins believe,
then, is that even though the human mind will be
able to understand the laws themselves and thus
be able to infer mechanism and order from these
basic laws, these inferences will not be particularly
useful or satisfying to people as a whole. We will
still continue to use models and concepts from the
levels of reality we are immediately dealing with to
understand nature.
On the other hand, we can also consider the
implications of a designer hypothesis. If that
hypothesis is true, an ultimate reference point to the
universe exists, and “meaning” takes on a genuine
significance. We do need to wonder what this
designer is like and what our relationship to him
might be. With a reference point, our existence is
important, and good and evil mean something real.
Obviously, Wiker and Witt take this stance.

As their book progresses, Wiker and Witt
continue to emphasize the meaning and genius
evident in the structure of nature. In a further
discussion of chemistry, they elaborate on the
depth and clarity of the periodic table, noting
how this depth and clarity enable students to
master the table’s organization in a series of
increasingly detailed steps. They also provide a
detailed discussion of the nature and properties of
water, with a particular emphasis on the unique
characteristics of water that make it particularly
suitable for the existence of life on Earth, observing
that this suitability illustrates the full meaning of
water. The remaining chapters consider the nature
of life itself. Unfortunately, here Wiker and Witt
drift away from a detailed interpretation of the
fundamental properties of organisms, concluding
that the complexity of the cell is inexplicable in
pure physical terms, given the incredible amount
of structure and information present. In the end,
they appeal to the “commonsense” conclusion that
life is real, based more on a linguistic analysis than
an appeal to basic science.
By the end, they shift from a positive argument
for design, such as the genius of the periodic table
or the careful design of the physical constants of
the universe, to a more negative stance with the
claim that biological life is inexplicable in chemical
terms. Throughout this discussion, they not only
point out gaps in knowledge that suggest a level
of order that cannot be explained in reductionist
terms, but also describe the depth, clarity,
harmony, and elegance of these phenomena.
Even though these arguments are refreshing
reading for the Christian, who too often forgets
about the meaning and purpose of the universe
(which is to glorify God), they will not sway the
materialist because the arguments presuppose an
open universe, which the materialist categorically
denies.
Furthermore, Wiker and Witt’s conclusion
does not stand. They correlate the materialists’
philosophical assumptions with the four-element
theory of Aristotle and the phlogiston theory, and
they conclude that because science showed these
theories to be wrong, reductionist materialism
should also be rejected as wrong, given the
amount of evidence in support of order, meaning,
and genius in nature. However, they fail to read
history correctly on this point. Yes, those theories
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of nature were rejected, but they were rejected
because they made explicit statements about the
structure of nature that were testable; in other
words, they were rejected by the normal process
of scientific elimination through experimentation.
In fact, reductionist materialism has generally been
a very fruitful method of approaching science,
and it still appears to be quite useful. It is also a
fundamental principle, an assumption about the
nature of science. As an assumption, rather than
a hypothesis or theory, it is not directly tested or
considered testable. Scientists take for granted the
notion that nature can be understood; they do not
attempt to test this assumption.

Unfortunately, a
pervasive problem
in Wiker and Witt’s
book is the tendency to
belittle and caricature
the reductionist
materialist. Too often
their claims are rejected
as unreasonable or
illogical. This tendency,
which is the outcome
of failing to confront
the assumptions that
materialists hold, results
from a confrontation
model rather than a
conversation model of
discussion.
The leap that reductionists take is their
conclusion that materialism is a sufficient

18
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explanation for all phenomena. They reason that
if they have a physical explanation that is sound, or
predicts other phenomena, it is complete, and they
know all they need to know. They don’t need to
see it as “masterfully arranged and elegant”—this
is not a useful or predictive category.
Unfortunately, a pervasive problem in Wiker
and Witt’s book is the tendency to belittle and
caricature the reductionist materialist. Too often
their claims are rejected as unreasonable or illogical.
This tendency, which is the outcome of failing to
confront the assumptions that materialists hold,
results from a confrontation model rather than a
conversation model of discussion.14
This discussion is important, however, because
it a metaphysical discussion, not one working
within the bounds of science itself. The materialist
works from the assumption that the universe is
closed, while the theist works from the assumption
that the universe is open. Both are able to use the
data of nature, and the theories that explain that
data, to argue for their position.
It is unfortunate, then, that Wiker and
Witt choose not to address the metaphysical
underpinnings of reductionist materialism. They do
touch on it in the last chapter. First, they note that
materialists are “blinded by their many successes in
using the mechanistic analogy to explain natural
phenomena”(246). In this they are quite correct,
but they somewhat miss the underlying cause.
They continue: “[s]uch blindness is actually a form
of the most ancient of sins, pride”(246). Pride
comes from the deeper sin of believing one does
not need a creator. Materialists are blinded by
their own assumption that the universe is closed.
With this assumption firmly entrenched in their
minds, it is impossible for them to see beyond the
material. They are blind to design, not because of
their pride but because of their closed minds.
Wiker and Witt close by suggesting that the
loss of meaning is a more basic problem than
the problem of evil. “Evil is parasitic on good”
they rightly say (251). However, the sin that
is at the root of evil has infected all aspects of
creation, therefore corrupting our understanding
of meaning. Nature suffers as a result of sin, so
our sin-laden hearts see a universe also stained by
sin, thereby making it much more difficult to see
meaning, genius, order, and purpose. That is, the
evidence appears flawed, compromised, so that it

is not irrefutable but enables the sinful heart to
conclude that the universe is nothing but matter
and that nothing else matters.
Francis Schaeffer puts it this way:
Is it possible to have intellectual integrity
while holding to the position of verbalized, propositional revelation? I would
say the answer is this: It is not possible if
you hold the presupposition of the uniformity of natural causes in a closed system.
If you do, any idea of revelation becomes
nonsense. If is not only that there are detailed problems in such a case, but that it
becomes absolute nonsense if you really believe in the uniformity of natural causes in
a closed system—namely, that everything
is a machine….Propositional, verbalized
revelation—knowledge that man has from
God—is a totally unthinkable concept.
This is because by definition everything is
a machine, so naturally there is no knowledge from outside, from God….[I]f you are
going to hold to the uniformity of natural
causes in the closed system, against all the
evidence (and I do insist it is against the evidence), then you will never, never be able
to consider the other presupposition which
was the basis for modern science in the first
place: the uniformity of natural causes in a
limited system, open to reordering by God
and by man.15
Wiker and Witt discuss a wide array of
evidence that the universe is not a closed system,
both in terms of the genius that is man and the
structure of the universe. In doing so, they will
aid the knowledge and faith of the believer. They
understand that faith can be built on sound
evidence from the structure of creation. But this
evidence will not be the antidote they hope because
the flaw is not in nature itself but in the assumption
of a closed universe, which, by definition, cannot
interact with anything from the outside.
In the end, it comes down to a simple choice.
Do you choose to believe the evidence that the
universe has a designer, or do you choose to believe
that it does not? If you choose the former, you have
opened yourself to the idea that the universe is not

closed, that there is a God. It follows that you
then have to consider who this God is and what
your relationship to him might be. If you choose
the latter, you have deduced that the universe is
closed, and if it is closed, there is no meaning or
purpose to existence; you are merely the accidental
outcome of a long series of random events.
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